Visual Cryptography for Black and White Images

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Abstract

A visual cryptography scheme is a method to encode a secret image SI into shadow images called shares such that, certain qualified subsets of shares enable the “visual” recovery of the secret image. The “visual” recovery consists of xeroxing the shares onto transparencies, and then stacking them. The shares of a qualified set will reveal the secret image without any cryptographic computation. Here, we analyze the construction of \(k\) out of \(n\) visual cryptography schemes for black and white images (In such a scheme any \(k\) shares out of \(n\) will reveal the secret image, but any \(k-1\) shares give no information about the image). The important parameters of a scheme are its contrast, i.e., the clarity of the decoded image, and the number of pixels needed to encode one pixel of the original image. We discuss some methods of construction of \((2, n)\)-schemes having optimal relative contrast using Hadamard matrices and some combinatorial block designs. We study the construction of an efficient \((3, n)\)-scheme. We also study the construction of \((3, n)\)-schemes using 3 designs and \((t, n)\)-schemes using \(t\)-designs. Some constructions for the general \((k, k)\) and \((k, n)\) schemes are also discussed.

Keywords: Hadamard Matrices, BIBDs, PBD.

1. Introduction

A secret sharing scheme permits a secret to be shared among a set \(P\) of \(n\) participants in such a way that only qualified subsets of \(P\) can recover the secret, and any non-qualified subset has absolutely no information on the secret. In other words, a non-qualified subset knows only that the secret is chosen from a prescribed set (which we assume is public knowledge), and they cannot compute any further information regarding the value of the secret. In 1979, Shamir [6] and Blakley [1] introduced the
concept of a threshold scheme. A \((k, n)\) threshold scheme is a method whereby \(n\) pieces of information of the secret key \(K\), called shares are distributed to \(n\) participants so that the secret key cannot be reconstructed from the knowledge of fewer than \(k\) shares. In 1994, Naor and Shamir (1995) proposed a new type of cryptographic scheme, which can decode secret images without any cryptographic computations. The basic model consists of a printed page of cipher text (which can be sent by mail or faxed) and anaprint transparency (which serves as a secret key). Each one of them is indistinguishable, but placing the transparency with the key over the page with the ciphertext can reveal the original text. The remarkable feature of this scheme is that the secret can be decoded directly by the human visual system; hence it can be called visual cryptography scheme. This basic model can be extended into the \(k\) out of \(n\) secret sharing problem; that is, given a secret message, one can generate \(n\) transparencies (so-called shares), and the original message is visible if at least \(k\) of them are stacked together but totally invisible or unanalyzable if fewer than \(k\) transparencies are stacked together. A VCS is mainly applied to a binary image containing a collection of black and white pixels, each of which is handled separately. Each pixel of the binary image is encoded into \(m\) black and white sub pixels, which are printed in close proximity to each other so that the human visual system averages their individual black/white contributions. Figure 1.1 is an illustration of \((2, 2)\)-threshold VCS. The encryption rules specify that a pixel is encoded into two sub pixels composing of one black and one white on each share.

![Figure 1.1: An (2, 2)-threshold VCS.](image)

2. \((2, N)\) - Threshold VCS
In this chapter, we consider only \((2, n)\)-threshold VCSs for black and white images. In [2], Naor and Shamir first proposed a \((2, n)\)-threshold VCS for black and white images. They constructed the 2 out of \(n\) visual secret sharing scheme by considering the two \(n \times n\) basis matrices \(S_0\) and \(S_1\) given as follows.
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$S_0$ is a Boolean matrix whose first column comprises of 1's and whose remaining entries are 0's. $S_1$ is simply the identity matrix of dimension $n$. When we encrypt a white pixel, we apply a random permutation to the columns of $S_0$ to obtain matrix $T$. We then distribute row $i$ of $T$ to participant $i$. To encrypt a black pixel, we apply permutation to $S_1$. A single share of a black or white pixel consists of a randomly placed black sub pixel and $n-1$ white sub pixels. Two shares of a white pixel have a combined Hamming weight of 1, whereas any two of a black pixel have a combined Hamming weight of 2, which looks darker. The visual difference between the two cases becomes clearer as we stack additional transparencies.

3. An Example Implementation of a (2, 2)-Threshold VCS

The basis matrices used here are

\[ S_0 = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & \cdots & 0 \end{bmatrix} \quad \text{and} \quad S_1 = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & \cdots & 0 \end{bmatrix} \]

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Figure 3.1: Original image.

Figure 3.2: Share 1
4. A Construction of (3, N)-Threshold VCS
The following scheme gives a 3 out of \( n \) scheme for an arbitrary \( n \geq 3 \). Let \( B \) be a black \( n \times (n-2) \) matrix which contains only 1’s, and let \( I \) be the \( n \times n \) identity matrix which contains 1’s on the diagonal and 0’s elsewhere. Then \( S_1 \) is the \( n \times (2n-2) \) matrix obtained by concatenating \( B \) and \( I \). And \( S_0 \) is the complement of the matrix \( S_1 \).

5. Construction of (\( K, K \))-threshold VCS
In [2], a \( k \) out of \( k \) visual cryptography scheme with pixel expansion \( 2^k-1 \) is described. The authors proved that the construction is optimal in that any \( k \) out of \( k \) scheme must use at least \( 2^k-1 \) pixels. The basis matrices are constructed as follows. \( S_1 \) is the \( k \times 2^k-1 \) matrix whose columns are all boolean \( n \)-vectors having an odd number of 1’s, and \( S_0 \) is the \( k \times 2^k-1 \) matrix whose columns are all boolean \( n \)-vectors having an even number of 1’s.
6. Construction of \((K, N)\)-threshold VCS When \(K\) Divides \(N\)

In this section, we describe a construction for \((k, n)\)-threshold VCS which is given in [5], for the case when \(k \mid n\). The result is generalized in the next section to any \(k\) and \(n\), \(n \geq k\). They make use of an initial matrix which is defined below.

Let \(n, l, k\) be integers such that \(k \mid n\). An initial matrix \(IM(n, l, k)\) in an \(n \times lm\)atrix whose entries are elements of a ground set \(A = \{a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_k\}\), in which the set of columns is equal to the set of vectors in which each element of \(A\) appears \(k/\)times.

7. Construction of \((K, N)\) VCS for any value of \(K\) and \(N\)

In the previous section we had seen a construction for a \((k, n)\)-threshold VCS when \(k \mid n\). To realize a \((k, n)\)-threshold VCS for any values of the parameters \(k\) and \(n\) we can construct, using the previous technique, a \((k, n_0)\)-threshold VCS, where \(n_0 \geq n\) is a multiple of \(k\), and then consider only the first \(n\) rows of the basis matrices of this scheme. The scheme obtained in this way is a \((k, n)\)-threshold VCS having the same parameters as the \((k, n_0)\)-threshold VCS. The following theorem states the existence of a \((k, n)\)-threshold VCS for any value of \(k\) and \(n\).

8. Conclusion

Visual Cryptography can be used to share a secret message among \(k\) participants, such that any \(k - 1\) participants can get no information about the secret message. In such schemes, only \(k\) or more shares can reveal the secret. We presented the model of \((k, n)\)-threshold Visual Cryptography Scheme. We studied techniques to construct \((2, n)\)-threshold VCS using Hadamard matrices and combinatorial structures such as BIBDs, PBDs. The techniques described give threshold visual cryptography schemes which are optimal with respect to relative contrast. An efficient \((3, n)\)-threshold VCS was discussed. A new construction of \((3, n)\)-threshold VCS using 3-design and \((t, n)\)-threshold VCS using \(t\)-design was also discussed. Some constructions for general \((k, k)\) and \((k, n)\) schemes were studied. We implemented the schemes and it was observed 3-designs give better relative contrast and also observed that \((k, n)\) secret sharing schemes are efficient for small values of \(k\). This is because, for large \(k\), pixel expansion becomes too large and also the contrast of the reconstructed image is poor. For future, two Multi-pixel Encoding Methods based on the visual cryptography scheme can be proposed. The main purpose of the proposed method is to solve the problem of pixel expansion and generate smooth-looking decoded images. For each time, we simultaneously encode \(m\) pixels, called an encryption sequence, on the secret image into \(m\) pixels on the share. Hence the size of the decoded image is the same as that of the secret image. Thus the proposed method holds immense potential in becoming a better sharing technique in visual cryptography scheme by efficiently using the memory space during decoding process.
References