

Routing and Neighbor Node Cooperation Scheme to Achieve Energy Efficient Encryption for Integrating Wireless Sensor Networks with Internet

V.Gayathri^{1*}, Y.S. Kumarswamy²

¹ *Research Scholar, Department of Computer Science., Rayalaseema University, Kurnool, 518007, Andhra Pradesh, India.*

² *Professor, Dean R&D, Department of Computer Science & Engineering., NCET, Bengaluru, Karnataka India.*

**Corresponding Author*

Abstract

The integration of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) with IP network has created IP specific security issues which were absent in classical WSNs. Most of the security issues in the IP network such as: data packet encryption, are addressed through computationally expensive security mechanisms. Recently, WSN data packet encryption scheme through 3 Data Encryption Standard (3DES) technique was presented in the literature. However, the 3DES technique, even-though provides robust security merits in data packet encryption, requires significant computational investment. It must be noted that, the sensor nodes depend upon limited energy reserves, and large computational load can rapidly deplete the energy reserves. Hence, the main open issue is to utilize 3DES encryption technique by incurring limited energy expenditures for WSNs. To achieve this open issue, an energy efficient encryption scheme denoted as Routing and Neighbor Node Cooperation (RNNC) is presented in this paper. The salient features of RNNC scheme are: it utilizes 3DES technique for data packet encryption; it distributes the encryption load of the source node to the neighbor and routing nodes; it achieves node energy conservation by distributing the encryption load, and still retains the security benefits of 3DES technique. The RNNC scheme is designed through randomized algorithm. Simulation study details of RNNC scheme against the contemporary technique are presented. In this simulation study, the RNNC scheme provides significant energy conservation benefits WRT data packet encryption against the contemporary technique.

I. INTRODUCTION

The WSNs are essentially used in sensing the required environment using different sensing parameters such as: temperature, humidity, pressure etc. The WSNs are characterized by low cost and low power sensor devices, which have energy resource limitations and perform communication through radio transceivers. The earliest security threats to the WSNs were essentially physical threats; wherein, some of the sensor nodes are modified by the attacker physically, which would result in disastrous consequences to the WSN users. Many security schemes were presented in the literature [1-7] to address the security issues

which evolved in classical WSNs. All these presented security schemes ensure that, the cryptographic procedures are energy efficient to prevent fast depletion of node energy reserves; hence, the corresponding encryption schemes of these cryptographic procedures also aim for energy efficiency.

Some of the important issues which create security threats in classical WSNs are outlined below:

1. The sensor nodes usually do not have a fixed structure, because the node locations are randomly selected. Due to the absence of predefined network structure, designing fault tolerance scheme which can operate effectively in all the network structure scenarios is difficult.
2. The link quality between sensor nodes is substantially dependent on the node energy status. If some of the participating nodes in the link become energy depleted, then, the link would become un-operative, and other links may have to be used for data transmission. It must be noted that, some of the links might create relatively more security threats due to the presence of malicious nodes in these links.
3. The sensor nodes have limitations in resources such as: storage capacity, processing capabilities and communication bandwidth. Due to such limitations in resources, utilization of computationally light security mechanisms becomes attractive. However, such computationally light security mechanisms might not be effective in addressing all the major security threats in WSN.
4. Most of the routing protocols which are designed for routing in WSN [8-16], majorly focus on achieving energy efficiency. However, most of these routing protocols do not consider security issues in their basic design. Hence, security mechanisms have to be built over these routing protocols, which might create a tradeoff between energy efficiency and security effectiveness.
5. Some of the WSNs are deployed in hostile conditions in which, human intervention for regular maintenance of WSNs becomes difficult. In such hostile conditions, the sensor nodes become easy target for physical attack by intruders.

1.1 Addressed Open Issues

The IoT framework has become extremely popular in integrating many physical devices with Internet; so that, these physical devices can be monitored and controlled from any location using IP network. Currently, IoT framework is being extensively used in different domains such as: crime prevention, military, industry, environment, agriculture, infrastructure and urban development [2].

The popularity of IoT framework has also reached the domain of WSNs [8-13]. In-fact, integrating WSN with IoT framework would provide the much needed accessibility advantage to the users, because many WSNs are deployed in hostile conditions, and collecting regular data from such WSNs can require substantial user effort and resources.

The integration of WSNs with IoT framework would create a scenario wherein, the security threats which exclusively plague the IP network, will also start creating security issues in WSNs. Hence, the WSNs have to be enabled to address these exclusive security threats plaguing the IP network. The obvious or straight forward solution to address IP network based security threats in WSNs is to use the established security schemes in the IP network domain which provide effectiveness in addressing such security issues. However, most of these effective security schemes in IP domain are computationally expensive [17], and using such security schemes in WSNs is infeasible due to energy resource limitations in sensor nodes; hence, it would lead to a scenario wherein, tradeoff between energy efficiency and security effectiveness has to be analyzed and incorporated in designing security mechanisms for IoT enabled WSNs; however, in the literature, this tradeoff study has not been effectively performed [17].

One of the popular and effective security schemes in IP network is the 3DES technique [17]. Recently, in the literature [17], the 3DES technique has been utilized to perform encryption of data packets in WSN. However, the encryption scheme presented in [17] does not perform tradeoff analysis study between energy efficiency and security effectiveness, and due to which, the encryption scheme can easily drain node energy reserves and cause network disconnection and also cause severe reduction in network communication effectiveness. Hence, the open issue addressed in this paper is to extend the encryption scheme presented in [17] by achieving the dual goal of improvement in energy efficiency during encryption process and maintaining security effectiveness of the 3DES technique.

In this work, a new energy efficient encryption technique is presented having the following features: the encryption load of the source node is distributed to two different group of nodes; the first group consists of the neighbor nodes of the source node, and the second group consists of the routing nodes which \in Quality of Service (QoS) oriented routing path between the source and destination nodes; for a given set of data packets, only a single group is selected to share the encryption load; due to the distributed encryption scheme, the

source node substantially conserves its energy, and the security effectiveness of the 3DES encryption scheme is maintained. It must be noted that, the proposed distributed 3DES encryption scheme can be directly extended to cater other effective IP encryption schemes, since, the 3DES encryption scheme is only considered as a black box, and the main goal of the proposed scheme is to achieve energy efficiency without sacrificing security effectiveness.

The proposed encryption scheme is denoted as Routing and Neighbor Node Cooperation (RNNC) scheme. The RNNC scheme is simulated in MATLAB, and compared against the contemporary encryption scheme presented in [17]. In the outlined simulation study, the RNNC scheme significantly outperforms the compared scheme in-terms of energy efficiency, and achieves its intended objective of maintaining security effectiveness and improved energy efficiency.

1.2 Paper Contributions

In this paper, the following contributions are made:

1. Initially, the formal description of the RNNC scheme is presented. The RNNC scheme is formally modeled through a scoring function for identifying the optimal solution corresponding to this scheme. The non-polynomial complexity of identifying the optimal solution of RNNC scheme is formally established. To procure an approximate solution for the RNNC scheme, a randomized algorithm is presented. Corresponding to this proposed randomized algorithm, the polynomial complexity and probabilistic bounds on the quality of the obtained solution WRT optimal solution are formally established.
2. The proposed RNNC scheme is simulated in MATLAB, and compared against the contemporary technique presented in [17]. The proposed RNNC scheme achieves substantial merits in-terms of energy efficiency against the contemporary technique. Also, the RNNC scheme achieves noticeable execution efficiency which establishes the feasibility of deploying RNNC scheme in real world scenarios.

This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the related work corresponding to security techniques in WSN; Section 3 briefly describes the 3DES technique and QoS oriented routing in WSNs; the RNNC scheme is presented in Section 4; in Section 5, the simulated analysis study of RNNC scheme is presented; finally, this paper is concluded in Section 6.

2. RELATED WORK

One of the prevalent attacks in the physical layer is the sweep and reactive jamming attack, which are a kind of DoS attack where the communication channel is jammed. The security mechanism presented in [18] addresses such attacks. Here, secure acknowledgments and channel hopping is employed.

However, the threat of wide band jamming is not effectively addressed.

The eavesdropping attack is another popular physical layer attack, where the adversary listens to the communication between nodes through data packet tampering. The security mechanism presented in [19] advocated Message Integrity Code (MIC). However, such measure can lead to increased overheads and transmission delays.

The DoS attack in which data transmission is denied by modifying physical layer and MAC headers, is a special kind of DoS attack. Such kind of DoS attacks were addressed in [18] by suitably encrypting the specific data payload. However, this solution does not cover all the headers, and only covers the MAC header.

The security scheme presented in [20] addressed statistical jamming attack. In this attack, the data packets are subjected to direct attack; since, the adversary has the information about data distribution or protocol details. Here, the proposed solution shortened the size of preamble. However, preamble shortening can limit the performance of MAC protocol.

The denial of sleep attack prevents the node from going into sleep by ensuring that, the node is always active. The solution presented in [21] against such attack, employs multiple counter measures such as: anti reply protection, authentication of link layer, defense against broadcast attack. However, this security scheme has not been effectively tested or simulated.

The fragmentation attack is caused when the packet fragmentation fields are changed, and due to which, reply attacks are inflicted, which results in receiver being flooded by data packets, or even DoS attack might emerge. The security scheme presented in [22] addresses the data fragmentation attack. Here, the security scheme utilized time stamp mechanism to secure against such attacks. However, the formats of legal fragmented packets have not been properly defined, and effective simulation or testing of this security scheme has not been properly done.

Another security scheme for fragmentation attacks is presented in [23]. This scheme utilizes split buffer and content chaining approach. However, significant overheads are created due to this scheme.

The authentication attack is caused when the attacker provides legal authentication for the transmitted data. Such attacks were addressed in [24]; wherein, network access control scheme was utilized to provide node identification. However, this scheme requires substantial testing.

The Botnet attack is caused when the attacker modifies legal data packets, and transmits these tampered packets to the receiving node. Such attacks were addressed in [25], through the design of Bot analysis module. However, this security scheme exhibits significant overheads.

The selective forwarding attack is inflicted when an adversary refuses to route the control or data packets towards intended nodes. The security mechanism presented in [26] -- denoted as

Light-weight Heartbeat -- addressed such attacks. However, this security mechanism does not provide any protection after the attack is identified.

Another security mechanism presented in [27] addressed selective forwarding attack, which improved the delivery ratio compared to Light-weight Heartbeat [26]. However, this security mechanism suffers from energy consumption overheads.

The security mechanism presented in [28] addressed the energy consumption overhead issue for the security mechanism presented in [27]; however, it suffers from not providing cent percent true positive rate.

The wormhole attack is inflicted through the creation of low link tunnel in-between two adversary nodes which are situated in different network locations. The Light-weight Heartbeat [26] addressed such attacks; wherein, each network segment was provided with separate keys. However, proper simulation for this security mechanism has not been performed.

The security mechanism presented in [29] also addresses wormhole attack by utilizing Merkel trees authentication. Here, messages are encrypted by nodes through keys. However, until the Merkel tree is established, overheads related to delay and jitter will be created.

The wormhole attack issue was addressed through graph theory approach in [30]. Here, encryption of messages is performed through local broadcast keys. This security mechanism provides the merits of limited overheads and zero synchronization.

The sinkhole attack is created through false information advertisement, which makes the adversary node an attractive center for attracting other sensor nodes. Such attacks will lead to transmission routes being compromised and increased data loss due to reduction in traffic. The security mechanism presented in [31] addresses such attacks by creating necessity for bidirectional communication. Another security mechanism for addressing sinkhole attack was presented in [32]. Here, hybrid mechanisms are utilized, and for dense networks, significant protection against such attacks is provided.

The malicious nodes inflict Sybil attack by creating multiple node identities, which can lead to the compromising of communication routes. The Light-weight Heartbeat [26] also addresses such attacks. However, there are issues regarding node location verification and scaling-up WRT large networks. The security mechanism presented in [33] also addresses Sybil attack. However, it faces the same issues faced by Light-weight Heartbeat [26].

Many routing protocols optimize their performance through operating rules. In the execution of such operating rules, many security threats arise. One such security threat is DAG/DAO inconsistency attack. Here, the malicious node tampers or alters the flags which are used in the identification of network inconsistencies. Due to which, the targeted node will reset trickle timer by discarding the control packet. Hence, more

frequent control messages will be transmitted, which creates higher delay and wastage of energy.

The DAG/DAO security issue was addressed in [34]. Here, the rate at which the tickle timer resets was limited through a specialized mechanism. However, certain critical issues persist for this work such as: no fixed threshold values, and node and network characteristics are not considered. Adaptive threshold based security mechanism was presented in [35] against DAG/DAO attacks. This mechanism improves upon the work presented in [34] in-terms of considering network characteristics. However, it still does not consider node characteristics. Another security mechanism was presented in [36] against DAG/DAO attack through dynamic approach. This mechanism further improves [35] by considering node characteristics.

The rank attack is caused when the malicious node advertises fake rank, in-order to attract significant traffic towards it. The main goal of rank attack is to establish non-optimal paths for routing. The security mechanism presented in [37] addresses the rank attacks. Here, hash operations are utilized to implement authentication. However, this mechanism still can become ineffective due to replay and forgery. Another security mechanism was presented in [38] to protect against rank attacks. The specialty of this mechanism is that, no cryptographic approach is utilized. However, there is still network size dependency.

The black hole attack is caused when the malicious node does not forward data packets which are routed towards it. Thus, essentially creating a object similar to black hole described in Astro-physics. Such attacks can result in significant increase in data loss due to reduced traffic. The security mechanism presented in [39] addresses black hole attack. However, this mechanism incurs significant overheads. Another security mechanism was presented in [40] against black hole attacks. The strength of this mechanism is that, even under attack, the throughput is maintained. However, there are still issues in identifying low rate attacks.

The sink-hole attack can further lead to different kinds of attacks such as: black holes, selecting forwarding, data tampering etc. Hence, the importance of sink-hole attack detection was outlined in [41]. Also, sink-hole detection mechanism based on link quality was presented in [41]. Even though this mechanism provides limited false positive rates, it suffers from significant overheads. This mechanism best suited for large networks. Another sink-hole detection mechanism was presented in [42]. This mechanism provides multiple merits such as: integrity, authentication and freshness. However, the effectiveness of this mechanism is still unsatisfactory.

The security mechanism presented in [43] -- indicated as Kinesis, specifically addresses data tampering attacks -- including selective forwarding and sink-hole attack. The merit of Kinesis is that, both attack identification and rectification is performed. However, this mechanism suffers due to redundant actions and hidden node issue.

From the presented literature survey, it is clear that, most of the security mechanisms presented against data tampering attack suffer from significant overhead issues, and there is significant scope to improve energy efficiency of robust encryption techniques such as 3DES, when they are applied to prevent data tampering attacks in WSN, and to address this outlined scope, the RNNC scheme is presented in the subsequent sections.

3. OVERVIEW

3.1 3DES Technique [17]

The 3DES technique is an extension of the DES technique which was designed in IBM during 1970s. The main features of DES encryption technique are: (1) The encryption key consists of 56 bits and these bits are selected through permutation scheme from initial 64 bits, and the left over 8 bits are converted into parity check bits or discarded. (2) The selected 56 bits are divided into two groups consisting of 28 bits each, and each group is subjected to separate computation. (3) Through iterative computation, both groups are subjected to bit-left rotation operation, and 24 bits are selected from each group. (4) Finally, the selected and unselected bits from step 3 are merged to create final 56 bits for performing data encryption.

Even though, DES became popular and was widely utilized, it became easy to break the encryption scheme through brute force attack. Hence, to improve the security robustness of DES technique, the 3DES technique was presented in the literature. The 3DES technique utilizes three cryptographic keys of length 64 bits each. These cryptographic keys are denoted as secret keys, and are involved in both encryption and decryption of data. The formal details of these secret keys are described below.

Let, E_1, E_2 and E_3 indicate the encryption keys corresponding to first, second and third secret keys; similarly, D_1, D_2 and D_3 indicate the decryption keys corresponding to first, second and third secret keys; m indicate the data block which is subjected to encryption, and c indicate the encrypted form of m .

The encryption process of 3DES technique is represented in Equation 1 -- here, m is initially encrypted using E_1 , and then, it is decrypted using D_2 , and finally, it is encrypted using E_3 to produce c .

$$c = E_3(D_2(E_1(m))) \quad (1)$$

The decryption process of 3DES technique is represented in Equation 2 -- here, c is initially decrypted using D_3 , and then, it is encrypted using E_2 , and finally it is decrypted using D_1 to produce m .

$$m = D_1(E_2(D_3(c))) \quad (2)$$

Since, 168 bits are involved in the encryption and decryption process of 3DES technique, substantial computational effort is involved in achieving the encryption of data packets. Hence, directly applying 3DES encryption technique for encrypting WSN data packets can result in rapid energy loss -- especially,

when large number of data packets need to be encrypted. The contemporary technique [17] directly applies 3DES encryption technique to encrypt WSN data packets, and this contemporary technique has to be optimized to achieve better energy efficiency, and this goal will be achieved through the proposed NNC scheme which is outlined in the next section.

3.2 QoS Oriented Routing in WSNs [44]

The QoS oriented routing involves routing data packets between source and destination nodes such that, each routing node will provide guarantees in satisfying the specified QoS parameters. The QoS oriented routing is especially used in critical applications; for example, the WSN which monitors natural disasters has to report the occurrence of such disaster events quickly, in-order to provide effective relief and avoid excessive negative consequences. Utilizing excessive QoS parameters can also lead to the scenario wherein, no routes might be available to perform data packet routing. Hence, the two most important and popularly used QoS parameters are Minimum Available Bandwidth (MAB) and Maximum Tolerable Delay (MTD). The MAB denotes the minimum threshold bandwidth which each routing node is expected to provide, and the MTD denotes the total maximum tolerable delay for each data packet when it traverses all the routing/intermediate nodes. The selected route for performing QoS oriented data packet routing should provide the facility wherein, each routing node will satisfy both MAB and MTD constraints.

One of the most popular routing techniques presented in the literature for performing QoS oriented routing in WSN is QoS Ad-hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (QAODV) routing technique. This routing technique comprises of three stages: Route Discovery stage, Data Packet Routing stage and Route Maintenance stage. All these three stages are described below.

Route Discovery stage -

In this stage, the source node indicated by S , discovers feasible routes to the destination node indicated by D . This route discovery process is initiated by S through the utilization of route discovery packets denoted as Route Request (RREQ) packets. In each of RREQ packets, S includes the information corresponding to: D , MAB and MTD. RREQ packets are transmitted or locally broadcasted to the neighbor nodes of S .

Suppose, a neighbor node of S indicated as A receives this RREQ packet, then, A performs the following actions: if A cannot satisfy both MAB and MTD constraints which are indicated inside the RREQ packet, then, it immediately drops the RREQ packet; if otherwise, A updates the MTD field in the RREQ packet as $MTD = MTD - delay_A$ here, $delay_A$ denotes the delay induced by A on each data packet; A also adds its signature inside RREQ, and retransmits the RREQ to its neighbor nodes.

Suppose B is one of the WSN nodes which has received RREQ packet from non-source node, then, B performs identical actions which are performed by A , and which have been described above.

After D receives the RREQ packet, it records all the feasible routes, and prepares a new packet denoted as Route Response (RREP) packet which contains the information of all the feasible routes. The RREP is transmitted back to S by using any of the feasible routes. Upon receiving RREP, S selects one of the feasible routes to perform data packet routing.




Figure 1: QAODV Route Discovery (MTD)




Figure 2: QAODV Route Discovery (MAB)

Figure 1 illustrates the route discovery process by specifically considering the MTD case. Here, A and D denote the source and destination nodes respectively. The source node discovers routes to D for two different applications. In the first application, the required MTD is $100ms$, and for the second application, the required MTD is $10ms$. The RREQ packets for the first and second applications are denoted as RREQ1 and RREQ2 respectively. The first application is able to identify a feasible route to D which traverses the intermediate nodes B and C respectively, because B and C guarantee data packet delay of $30ms$ and $50ms$ respectively. However, the same route denoted by $A-B-C-D$ cannot be utilized for RREQ2, because the MTD demand is $10ms$. Hence, the RREQ2 is dropped by B .

Figure 2 illustrates the route discovery process by specifically considering the MAB case. This case utilizes the same scenario described for Figure 1. The MAB value in RREQ1 is $10kbps$. The first application is able to identify a feasible route denoted by $A-B-C-D$, because B and C guarantee minimum bandwidths of $100kbps$ and $50kbps$ respectively. However, $A-B-C-D$ cannot be a feasible route for the second application because the corresponding MAB value is $80kbps$, and C cannot satisfy the MAB constraint. Hence, C drops the RREQ packet. Finally, D prepares RREP packet for the first application denoted as RREP1 and includes the information of $A-B-C-D$. This RREP1 is transmitted to A through $D-C-B-A$.

Data Packet Routing Stage -

In this stage, the actual transmission of data packets is performed between S and D . Each data packet is forwarded by S to the next hop which is recorded for the utilized route, and this process is also employed by the intermediate nodes of the routing path.

Route Maintenance Stage -

During the data packet routing stage, if some routing node cannot satisfy the QoS constraints, then, such node will generate control messages, and informs S about its situation. The source node will halt the data packet routing process, and re-invokes the route discovery stage in-order to find new feasible routes for continuing data packet routing.

QAODV for RNNC Scheme

The RNNC scheme will utilize the routing nodes corresponding to the routing path discovered through QAODV protocol, for sharing the encryption load of S , and the intuition for such a design framework is that, the routing nodes which provide QoS are usually resource rich nodes, and can provide the necessary computational resources for performing data packet encryption. However, if feasible routes are not discovered through QAODV protocol, then, any non-QoS oriented routing path between S and D and its corresponding routing nodes will be utilized in sharing the encryption load of S . The detailed description of the RNNC scheme and its utilization of QAODV protocol is outlined in the next section.

4. RNNC SCHEME

4.1 Problem Formulation

Let, S indicate the source node, $S_N = [s_1, s_2, \dots, s_n]$ indicate the set of neighbor nodes for S , and D indicate the destination node or the base station. Here, S transmits its collected data packets to D , and D will forward these data packets to the IP network through available IP Gateways. Let, $R_S = [r_1, r_2, \dots, r_m]$ indicate the set of routing nodes in the QoS based routing path which is denoted as Q_{SD} between S and D . The Q_{SD} is selected through QAODV routing technique which is described in Section 3.2.

Let, $DP_S = [d_1, d_2, \dots, d_k]$ indicate the set of data packets of S which needs to be encrypted using 3DES encryption technique, and has to be transmitted to D . For each s_i ($1 \leq i \leq n$): re_i indicates the remnant energy of s_i -- here, re_i is normalized between $[0,100]$ in which 0 and 100 indicate the lowest and highest remnant energy respectively; sa_i denotes the indicator random variable where only two values can be taken by it -- 1 and 100 , 1 and 100 denote that, s_i is currently involved and not-involved in sensing activity respectively; ro_i denotes the indicator random variable where only two values can be taken by it -- 1 and 100 , 1 and 100 denote that, s_i is currently involved and not-involved in routing activity

respectively. For each r_i ($1 \leq i \leq m$) the parameters: re_i , ro_i and sa_i , have the identical definition which is outlined above for s_i .

Let, $size(d_j)$ ($1 \leq j \leq k$) denote the data size in bytes of d_j , and $expense(s_i)$ denotes the energy expenditure of s_i in performing 3DES encryption on a single data byte -- here, $expense(s_i)$ is normalized between $[0,100]$. The metric $expense(r_i)$ has the identical definition outlined for: $expense(s_i)$.

Let, $CS_{Nr} = (\hat{s}_1, \hat{s}_2, \dots, \hat{s}_k)$ denote a candidate solution for RNNC scheme corresponding to S_N wherein; d_j is encrypted by \hat{s}_j . Similarly, $CS_{Rr} = (\hat{r}_1, \hat{r}_2, \dots, \hat{r}_k)$ denote a candidate solution for RNNC scheme corresponding to R_S wherein; d_j is encrypted by \hat{r}_j .

The merit of assigning d_j to \hat{s}_j is evaluated through $NodeScore()$, which is represented in Equation 3 -- here, c_1, c_2 and c_3 indicate the tunable constants. Also, there is no restriction that, the nodes $\in CS_{Nr}$ should be distinct. Similarly, The merit of assigning d_j to \hat{r}_j is evaluated through $NodeScore()$, which is represented in Equation 4.

$$NodeScore(d_j, \hat{s}_j) = c_1 \widehat{re}_j + c_2 \widehat{sa}_j + c_3 \widehat{ro}_j \quad (3)$$

$$NodeScore(d_j, \hat{r}_j) = c_1 \widehat{re}_j + c_2 \widehat{sa}_j + c_3 \widehat{ro}_j \quad (4)$$

When, d_j is encrypted by \hat{s}_j , corresponding update on \widehat{re}_j is performed through $NodeUpdate()$ as represented in Equation 5. Similarly, when, d_j is encrypted by \hat{r}_j , corresponding update on \widehat{re}_j is performed through $NodeUpdate()$ as represented in Equation 6.

$$NodeUpdate(d_j, \hat{s}_j) = \widehat{re}_j - size(d_j)expense(\hat{s}_j) \quad (5)$$

$$NodeUpdate(d_j, \hat{r}_j) = \widehat{re}_j - size(d_j)expense(\hat{r}_j) \quad (6)$$

The merit of each candidate solution corresponding to S_N such as CS_{Nr} is evaluated through $ScoreCS()$ which is represented in Equation 7 -- here, $NodeScore(d_j, \hat{s}_j | CS_{Nr} - \hat{s}_j)$ calculates $NodeScore(d_j, \hat{s}_j)$ by considering the nodes $\in (CS_{Nr} - \hat{s}_j)$ have already performed their encryption and corresponding $NodeUpdate()$ operations have been executed by all the nodes $\in (CS_{Nr} - \hat{s}_j)$. It must be noted that, higher values of $ScoreCS()$ indicates that, the corresponding candidate solutions provide more beneficial solutions to the RNNC scheme. Similarly, the merit of each candidate solution corresponding to R_S such as CS_{Rr} is evaluated through $ScoreCS()$ which is represented in Equation 8.

$$ScoreCS(CS_{Nr}) = \sum_{j=1}^k NodeScore(d_j, \hat{s}_j | CS_{Nr} - \hat{s}_j) \quad (7)$$

$$ScoreCS(CS_{Rr}) = \sum_{j=1}^k NodeScore(d_j, \hat{r}_j | CS_{Rr} - \hat{r}_j) \quad (8)$$

The Theorem 1 considers the scenario wherein, R_S is ignored from the RNNC scheme. In this scenario, the optimal candidate solution of the RNNC scheme is the one which maximizes Equation 7. Similarly, Theorem 2 considers the scenario wherein, S_N is ignored from the RNNC scheme. In this scenario, the optimal candidate solution of the RNNC scheme is the one which maximizes Equation 8. Theorem 3

provides the details regarding the optimal candidate solution of the RNNC scheme.

Theorem 1. Suppose, R_S is ignored from the RNNC scheme, then, the optimal candidate solution of RNNC scheme which is indicated as CS_{No} is that candidate solution which maximizes Equation 7.

Proof. Suppose, CS_{No} is the candidate solution obtained by maximizing Equation 7, and CS_{Nr} is the optimal candidate solution. Assuming, $CS_{No} \neq CS_{Nr}$ and $CS_{No} < CS_{Nr}$ -- however, from the Equation 7 it is clear that, $ScoreCS()$ belongs to the class of monotonic functions, and this assumption cannot be valid which immediately proves the Theorem.

Theorem 2. Suppose, S_N is ignored from the RNNC scheme, then, the optimal candidate solution of RNNC scheme which is indicated as CS_{Ro} is that candidate solution which maximizes Equation 8.

Proof. The proof for this Theorem is similar to the proof presented for Theorem 1.

Theorem 3. The optimal candidate solution of the RNNC scheme which is denoted as CS_o is represented through Equation 9.

Proof. From Theorem 1 it is evident that, when R_S is ignored then, $CS_o = CS_{No}$. Similarly, from Theorem 2 it is evident that, when S_N is ignored, then, $CS_o = CS_{Ro}$. The optimal candidate solution for the RNNC scheme is selected by considering both R_S and S_N . Hence, the Theorem immediately follows.

$$CS_o = \max(CS_{Ro}, CS_{No}) \quad (9)$$

The Theorems 4, 5 and 6 denote that, the searching problems to find: CS_{No} , CS_{Ro} and CS_o respectively, have non-polynomial complexities. Hence, approximate solution technique which runs in polynomial complexity and provide approximate solution which are closer to CS_o need to be designed, and this technique is presented in Section 4.2.

Theorem 4. The searching problem to find CS_{No} has non-polynomial complexity.

Proof. The number of distinct nodes involved in the candidate solution varies from 1 to k , because there is no restriction of nodes $\in CS_{Nr}$ should be distinct. So, the number of candidate solutions which can be possibly created is bounded by $\geq k + \binom{k}{2} + \binom{k}{3} + \dots + \binom{k}{k}$, which immediately proves the Theorem.

Theorem 5. The searching problem to find CS_{Ro} has non-polynomial complexity.

Proof. The proof for this Theorem is similar to the proof of Theorem 4.

Theorem 6. The searching problem to find CS_o has non-polynomial complexity.

Proof. The searching problem to find CS_o has to separately search for CS_{No} and CS_{Ro} , and both of these searching schemes have non-polynomial complexity, which immediately proves the Theorem.

4.2 Algorithm

Algorithm 1 RTRNNC (S, D, S_N, R_S, DP_S)

```

For ( $j = 1; j \leq k; j++$ )
     $flag_j = 0$ 
EndFor
    EncryptedList=CreateEmptyList()
If ( $potential(R_S) \leq potential(S_N)$ )
    For ( $j = 1; j \leq k; j++$ )
    For ( $i = 1; i \leq n; i++$ )
    If ( $rand(0,1) \leq P_{ji}$ )
        TransmitPacket( $S, s_i, d_j$ )
        EncryptPacket3DES( $s_i, d_j$ )
        TransmitPacket( $s_i, S, d_j$ )
        Add(EncryptedList,  $d_j$ )
         $flag_j = 1$ 
    Break
    EndIf
    EndFor
    EndFor
EndIf
If ( $potential(R_S) > potential(S_N)$ )
    For ( $j = 1; j \leq k; j++$ )
    For ( $i = 1; i \leq m; i++$ )
    If ( $rand(0,1) \leq P_{ji}$ )
        RoutePacket( $S, r_i, d_j$ )
        EncryptPacket3DES( $r_i, d_j$ )
        RoutePacket( $r_i, D, d_j$ )
        Add(EncryptedList,  $d_j$ )
         $flag_j = 1$ 
    Break
    EndIf
    EndFor
    EndFor
EndIf
For ( $j = 1; j \leq n; j++$ )
    If ( $flag_j == 0$ )
        EncryptPacket3DES( $S, d_j$ )
        Add(EncryptedList,  $d_j$ )
     $flag_j = 1$ 
    EndIf
EndFor
Return EncryptedList
    
```

The approximate solution technique for the RNNC scheme is designed through randomized algorithm which is outlined in Algorithm 1, which is indicated as Randomized Technique for

RNNC (RTRNNC). The description of RTRNNC is outlined below.

Initially, all the data packets $\in DP_S$ are marked through $flag_j$ in-order to indicate that, the encryption of these data packets is pending. An empty list indicated as *EncryptedList* is created through *CreateEmptyList()* in-order to store the encrypted data packets.

The metrics $potential(R_S)$ and $potential(S_N)$ denote the potential of obtaining CS_o from R_S and S_N respectively. The metrics $potential(R_S)$ and $potential(S_N)$ are represented in Equations 10 and 11 respectively.

$$potential(R_S) = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^m NodeScore(d_j, r_i)}{m} \quad (10)$$

$$potential(S_N) = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n NodeScore(d_j, s_i)}{n} \quad (11)$$

If: $potential(R_S) \leq potential(S_N)$, then, the following procedure described below is executed.

Each data packet or $d_j \in DP_S$ is considered sequentially for encryption, and to encrypt this data packet each $s_i \in S_N$ is considered sequentially. The probability of encrypting d_j by s_i is calculated through $P(d_j, s_i)$ or P_{ji} which is represented in Equation 12.

$$P(d_j, s_i) = P_{ji} = \frac{c_1 r e_i + c_2 s a_i + c_3 r o_i}{100(c_1 + c_2 + c_3)} \quad (12)$$

If the value of the random number generator function indicated by *rand()* which generates numbers between 0 and 1, is $\leq P_{ji}$ then this event indicates that encryption of d_j should be performed through s_i . Hence to accomplish this encryption: (1) d_j is transmitted to s_i by S through *TransmitPacket()*; (2) s_i performs 3DES encryption of d_j through *EncryptPacket3DES()* and this function also executes *NodeUpdate()* for updating about s_i for encrypting d_j ; (3) d_j which is in encrypted format is transmitted back to S by s_i through *TransmitPacket()*; (4) d_j is added to the *EncryptedList* using *Add()*; (5) finally, $flag_j$ is set to 1.

If: $potential(R_S) > potential(S_N)$, then, the following procedure described below is executed.

Each data packet or $d_j \in DP_S$ is considered sequentially for encryption, and to encrypt this data packet each $r_i \in R_S$ is considered sequentially. The probability of encrypting d_j by r_i is calculated through $P(d_j, r_i)$ or P_{ji} which is represented in Equation 13.

$$P(d_j, r_i) = P_{ji} = \frac{c_1 r e_i + c_2 s a_i + c_3 r o_i}{100(c_1 + c_2 + c_3)} \quad (13)$$

If the value of the random number generator function indicated by *rand()* which generates numbers between 0 and 1, is $\leq P_{ji}$ then this event indicates that encryption of d_j should be performed through r_i . Hence to accomplish this encryption: (1) d_j is routed to r_i by S through *RoutePacket()*; (2) r_i performs 3DES encryption of d_j through *EncryptPacket3DES()* and this function also executes

NodeUpdate() for updating about r_i for encrypting d_j ; (3) d_j which is in encrypted format is routed to D by r_i through *RoutePacket()*; (4) d_j is added to the *EncryptedList* using *Add()*; (5) finally, $flag_j$ is set to 1.

After considering every $d_j \in DP_S$ for performing encryption through the aid of nodes $\in S_N$ or R_S , if some of the data packets still have not been encrypted which is identified through $flag_j$, such data packets are eventually encrypted by S through *EncryptPacket3DES()* and added to *EncryptedList* using *Add()*. Finally, *EncryptedList* is returned by Algorithm 1.

The Theorem 7 outlines the fact that, Algorithm 1 discovers or utilizes CS_o for encryption of all the data packets $\in DP_S$ based on certain probability, and the details of the corresponding probability mass function are presented in next Theorem.

Theorem 7. Algorithm 1 belongs to the class of Monte-Carlo randomized algorithms.

Proof. Each node $\in CS_o$ is selected for encryption by Algorithm 1 based on probability which is represented in Equations 12 or 13. Hence, selection of all the nodes $\in CS_o$ by Algorithm 1 for encryption of all the data packets $\in DP_S$ is again based on probability which immediately proves the Theorem.

Under the condition: $potential(R_S) \leq potential(S_N)$, let, the probability of choosing CS_{Nr} -- which is one of the candidate solutions of the RNNC scheme $\in S_N$ -- by Algorithm 1 for encrypting all the data packets $\in DP_S$ be indicated by $P(CS_{Nr})$. The Theorem 8 outlines the upper bound on the metric $P(CS_{Nr})$.

Theorem 8. The metric $P(CS_{Nr})$ is upper bounded as represented in Equation 14.

Proof. Algorithm 1 selects s_i for encrypting d_j through a Bernoulli trial wherein; the success probability of this Bernoulli trial is represented in Equation 12. Also, each Bernoulli trial is independent of the others. Hence, by using the law of joint probability of independent Bernoulli trials, the Theorem immediately follows.

$$P(CS_{Nr}) \leq \prod_{j=1}^k P(d_j, \hat{s}_j) \quad (14)$$

Under the condition: $potential(R_S) > potential(S_N)$: Let, the probability of choosing CS_{Rr} -- which is one of the candidate solutions of the RNNC scheme $\in R_S$ -- by Algorithm 1 for encrypting all the data packets $\in DP_S$ be indicated by $P(CS_{Rr})$. The Theorem 9 outlines the upper bound on the metric $P(CS_{Rr})$.

Theorem 9. The metric $P(CS_{Rr})$ is upper bounded as represented in Equation 15.

Proof. Algorithm 1 selects r_i for encrypting d_j through a Bernoulli trial wherein; the success probability of this Bernoulli trial is represented in Equation 15. The remaining

part of the proof is identical to the proof presented for Theorem 8.

$$P(CS_{Rr}) \leq \prod_{j=1}^k P(d_j, \hat{r}_j) \quad (15)$$

The Theorem 10 outlines the relationship between Equations 7 and 14.

Theorem 10. *If $CS_{Nr} \neq CS_{Nz}$ and $ScoreCS(CS_{Nr}) \leq ScoreCS(CS_{Nz})$ then, $P(CS_{Nr}) \leq P(CS_{Nz})$*

Proof. Since, the LHS of both Equations 7 and 14 take only non-negative values, and by comparing both these Equations, it is clear that, the Theorem immediately follows.

The Theorem 11 outlines the relationship between Equations 8 and 15.

Theorem 11. *If $CS_{Rr} \neq CS_{Rz}$ and $ScoreCS(CS_{Rr}) \leq ScoreCS(CS_{Rz})$ then, $P(CS_{Rr}) \leq P(CS_{Rz})$*

Proof. Since, the LHS of both Equations 8 and 15 take only non-negative values, and by comparing both these Equations, it is clear that, the Theorem immediately follows.

Theorem 12 asserts that, under the condition: $potential(R_S) \leq potential(S_N)$, CS_{No} has the highest probability for being selected by Algorithm 1 for encryption of all the data packets $\in DP_S$ when compared against other candidate solutions $\in S_N$.

Theorem 12. $P(CS_{Nr}) \leq P(CS_{No})$ where $CS_{Nr} \neq CS_{No}$

Proof. Since, CS_{No} is the optimal candidate solution of the RNNC scheme when only S_N is considered, implying that $ScoreCS(CS_{Nr}) \leq ScoreCS(CS_{No})$. Hence, by using Theorem 10, this Theorem immediately follows.

Theorem 13 asserts that, under the condition: $potential(R_S) > potential(S_N)$, CS_{Ro} has the highest probability for being selected by Algorithm 1 for encryption of all the data packets $\in DP_S$ when compared against other candidate solutions $\in R_S$.

Theorem 13. $P(CS_{Rr}) \leq P(CS_{Ro})$ where $CS_{Rr} \neq CS_{Ro}$

Proof. Since, CS_{Ro} is the optimal candidate solution of the RNNC scheme when only R_S is considered, implying that $ScoreCS(CS_{Rr}) \leq ScoreCS(CS_{Ro})$. Hence, by using Theorem 11, this Theorem immediately follows.

The Theorem 14 describes the importance of the metric $potential()$ in discovering CS_o .

Theorem 14. *The conditions: $potential(R_S) > potential(S_N)$ and $potential(R_S) \leq potential(S_N)$ used in Algorithm 1 aids in discovering CS_o .*

Proof. The metric $potential()$ presents an aggregated representation of the resources present in the nodes of S_N and R_S . Since, CS_o consists of those nodes which have the highest resources, the Theorem immediately follows.

The Theorem 15 represents the probability of selecting CS_o by Algorithm 1, and CS_o has the highest probability of being

selected when compared to other candidate solutions of the RNNC scheme.

Theorem 15. *If $potential(R_S) > potential(S_N)$, then with high chances, $P(CS_o) = P(CS_{Ro})$. If $potential(R_S) \leq potential(S_N)$, then with high chances, $P(CS_o) = P(CS_{No})$.*

Proof. From Theorem 14, it is clear that, due to the metric $potential()$ the chances of Algorithm 1 discovering the actual group of candidate solutions in which CS_o is present is high. Hence, the Theorem immediately follows.

Under the condition: $potential(R_S) \leq potential(S_N)$, the Theorem 16 asserts the fact that, if the resource capabilities of each node $\in CS_{No}$ is high, then, Algorithm 1 has higher chances of selecting CS_{No} for encryption of all the data packets $\in DP_S$.

Theorem 16. *If the values $(\widehat{r}_{e_j}, \widehat{s}_{a_j}, \widehat{s}_{o_j})$ for each $\hat{s}_j \in CS_{No}$ are high, then, $P(CS_{No})$ will have higher values.*

Proof. By analyzing Equation 12, it is clear that, if the values $(\widehat{r}_{e_j}, \widehat{s}_{a_j}, \widehat{s}_{o_j})$ are high, then, $P(d_j, \hat{s}_j)$ will have higher values, and correspondingly by analyzing Equation 14 it is clear that, $P(CS_{No})$ will have higher value.

Under the condition: $potential(R_S) > potential(S_N)$, the Theorem 17 asserts the fact that, if the resource capabilities of each node $\in CS_{Ro}$ is high, then, Algorithm 1 has higher chances of selecting CS_{Ro} for encryption of all the data packets $\in DP_S$.

Theorem 17. *If the values $(\widehat{r}_{e_j}, \widehat{s}_{a_j}, \widehat{s}_{o_j})$ for each $\hat{r}_j \in CS_{Ro}$ are high, then, $P(CS_{Ro})$ will have higher values.*

Proof. By analyzing Equation 13, it is clear that, if the values $(\widehat{r}_{e_j}, \widehat{s}_{a_j}, \widehat{s}_{o_j})$ are high, then, $P(d_j, \hat{r}_j)$ will have higher values, and correspondingly by analyzing Equation 15 it is clear that, $P(CS_{Ro})$ will have higher value.

Under the condition: $potential(R_S) \leq potential(S_N)$, the Theorems 18 and 20 assert that, Algorithm 1 rarely selects candidate solutions which are having limited resources. Similarly, under the condition: $potential(R_S) > potential(S_N)$, the Theorems 19 and 21 assert that, Algorithm 1 rarely selects candidate solutions which are having limited resources

Theorem 18. *If for some CS_{Nr} where $CS_{Nr} \neq CS_{No}$ and $ScoreCS(CS_{Nr})$ has low value, then, $P(CS_{Nr})$ also has lower value.*

Proof. The proof for this Theorem is a direct consequence of Theorem 10. Hence, this Theorem immediately follows.

Theorem 19. *If for some CS_{Rr} where $CS_{Rr} \neq CS_{Ro}$ and $ScoreCS(CS_{Rr})$ has low value, then, $P(CS_{Rr})$ also has lower value.*

Proof. The proof for this Theorem is a direct consequence of Theorem 11. Hence, this Theorem immediately follows.

Theorem 20. *If for some CS_{Nr} where $CS_{Nr} \neq CS_{No}$ and the values $(\widehat{r}_{e_j}, \widehat{s}_{a_j}, \widehat{s}_{o_j})$ for each $\hat{s}_j \in CS_{Nr}$ are low, then, $P(CS_{Nr})$ will have lower value.*

Proof. The proof for this Theorem is a direct consequence of Theorem 16. Hence, this Theorem immediately follows.

Theorem 21. If for some CS_{Rr} where $CS_{Rr} \neq CS_{Ro}$ and the values $(\hat{r}e_j, \hat{s}a_j, \hat{s}o_j)$ for each $\hat{r}_j \in CS_{Rr}$ are low, then, $P(CS_{Rr})$ will have lower value.

Proof. The proof for this Theorem is a direct consequence of Theorem 17. Hence, this Theorem immediately follows.

The Theorem 22 asserts that, the computational complexity of Algorithm 1 is polynomial.

Theorem 22. Algorithm 1 has polynomial time complexity.

Proof. Under the condition: $potential(R_S) \leq potential(S_N)$, Algorithm 1 considers each data packet $\in DP_S$ sequentially, and to encrypt each data packet, it considers the nodes $\in S_N$ also sequentially. Since, $|S_N| = n$ and $|DP_S| = k$, it implies that, the execution complexity of Algorithm 1 can be bounded by $O(\max(k, n)^2)$. Under the condition: $potential(R_S) > potential(S_N)$, Algorithm 1 considers each data packet $\in DP_S$ sequentially, and to encrypt each data packet, it considers the nodes $\in R_S$ also sequentially. Since, $|R_S| = m$ and $|DP_S| = k$, it implies that, the execution complexity of Algorithm 1 can be bounded by $O(\max(k, m)^2)$. Hence, the Theorem immediately follows.

The system design flow diagram for implementing the RNNC scheme is illustrated in Figure 1. There are six components involved in implementing the RNNC scheme. The *Node Statistics Collector* component is responsible for collecting the node statistics required for RNNC scheme which includes source node and all its corresponding neighbors. The *Executor* component is responsible for executing Algorithm 1 with the aid of *Encryption* and *QoS* components; the former performs the required 3DES encryption of data packets, and the latter executes QAODV protocol to identify suitable QoS oriented route between source and destination nodes. The *Node Statistics Updater* component is responsible for collecting the current information of those nodes which have been involved in the RNNC scheme, and update this information in *Node Statistics Collector* component. The *Executor* continuously procures information from the *Node Statistics Collector* component in-order to utilize the current node information for executing Algorithm 1. Finally, the *Executor* routes the encrypted data packets to the Base Station through the *Transmitter* component.




Figure 1: System Design Flow Diagram

5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

5.1 Simulation Setup

The proposed RNNC scheme is simulated in MATLAB, and for the ease of reference, the proposed scheme will be denoted as RNNC. The contemporary technique outlined in [17] is also simulated along with RNNC, and for the ease of reference, this contemporary technique will be denoted as COT. The simulation settings are outlined in Table 1.

Table 1: Simulation Parameter Settings

| Simulation Parameters | Used Values |
|-----------------------|-------------------------------------|
| $ S_N $ | Varied between [10,100] |
| $ R_S $ | Varied between [5,20] |
| $ DP_S $ | Varied between [10,100] |
| re_i | Varied between [1,100] |
| sa_i | Either 1 or 100 |
| ro_i | Either 1 or 100 |
| $size(d_j)$ | Varied between $[10^3, 10^4]$ |
| $expense(s_i)$ | Varied between $[10^{-3}, 10^{-4}]$ |
| c_1 | 2 |
| c_2 | 1 |
| c_3 | 1 |

The performance metric used in the simulation study analysis is denoted as *Average Energy Consumption (AVEC)*. Under the condition: $potential(R_S) \leq potential(S_N)$ for Algorithm 1, AVEC is represented in Equation 16: here, $TSize(s_i)$ is the total size of all the data packets encrypted by $s_i \in S_N$; s_i should be involved in the encryption of at-least one data packet; \bar{S}_N contains those nodes of S_N which have involved in the encryption of at-least one data packet; $I(\bar{S}_N)$ denotes the indicator variable which takes either of the two values $|\bar{S}_N| + 1$ or $|\bar{S}_N|$ depending whether S is involved in the encryption of at-least one data packet or otherwise respectively. Clearly for COT, $|S_N| = 0$, because all the data packets are encrypted by S . The metric AVEC highlights the average energy consumed by each node $\in S_N$ in encrypting the data packets $\in DP_S$. Clearly, higher values of AVEC indicate that, the utilized technique is node-energy inefficient, and can result in rapid node energy drainage.

$$AVEC = \frac{\sum_i expense(s_i)TSize(s_i) + expense(S)TSize(S)}{I(\bar{S}_N)} \quad (16)$$

Under the condition: $potential(R_S) > potential(S_N)$ for Algorithm 1, AVEC is represented in Equation 17: here, $TSize(r_i)$ is the total size of all the data packets encrypted by $r_i \in R_S$; r_i should be involved in the encryption of at-least one data packet; \bar{R}_S contains those nodes of R_S which have involved in the encryption of at-least one data packet; $I(\bar{R}_S)$ denotes the indicator variable which takes either of the two values $|\bar{R}_S| + 1$ or $|\bar{R}_S|$ depending whether S is involved in the encryption of at-least one data packet or otherwise respectively. Clearly for COT, $|R_S| = 0$, because all the data packets are encrypted by S . The metric AVEC highlights the

average energy consumed by each node $\in R_S$ in encrypting the data packets $\in DP_S$.

$$AVEC = \frac{\sum_i expense(r_i)TSize(r_i)+expense(S)TSize(S)}{I(R_S)} \quad (17)$$

In-order to study the influence of AVEC on: re_i , sa_i and ro_i , three metrics are defined respectively. The first metric is denoted as $R(re_i)$ which indicates the ratio of those nodes $\in S_N \cup R_S$ which have their corresponding value for $re_i = 100$. The second metric is denoted as $R(sa_i)$ which indicates the ratio of those nodes $\in S_N \cup R_S$ which have their corresponding value for $sa_i = 100$. The third metric is denoted as $R(ro_i)$ which indicates the ratio of those nodes $\in S_N$ which have their corresponding value for $ro_i = 100$. Clearly, higher values of $R(re_i)$, $R(sa_i)$ and $R(ro_i)$ indicate that S_N and R_S contain resource rich nodes.

5.2 Discussions on Simulation Results

The first simulated experiment analyzes the performance of COT and RNNC WRT AVEC when $|S_N \cup R_S|$ is varied and other simulation parameters are kept constant. The result analysis of the first simulated experiment is illustrated in Figure 2, and the following observations are made: (1) since, $S_N \cup R_S$ has no influence on COT, the performance of COT remains constant. (2) RNNC substantially outperforms COT primarily due to its encryption load sharing design. (3) The performance of RNNC is positively correlated with, $|S_N \cup R_S|$ because as the number of neighbor and routing nodes of S increase, the encryption load distribution becomes more effective.




Figure 2: $|S_N \cup R_S|$ vs AVEC

The second simulated experiment analyzes the performance of COT and RNNC WRT AVEC when $|DP_S|$ is varied and other simulation parameters are kept constant. The result analysis of the second simulated experiment is illustrated in Figure 3, and the following observations are made: (1) the performance of COT suffers mainly due to lack of encryption load sharing mechanism. (2) The performance of COT is negatively correlated with $|DP_S|$ because as the number of data packets increase, resource investment for data packet encryption also increases. (3) RNNC provides substantial performance

improvement over COT for the same reason outlined in Observation (2) for the first simulated experiment. (4) The performance of RNNC is negatively correlated with $|DP_S|$ because of the same reason outlined in Observation (2).




Figure 3: $|DP_S|$ vs AVEC

In-order to perform the third simulated experiment, $size(d_j)$ for all the data packets $\in DP_S$ is kept constant. Specifically, the third simulated experiment analyzes the performance of RNNC and COT WRT AVEC when $size(d_j)$ is varied and other simulation parameters are kept constant. The result analysis of the third simulated experiment is illustrated in Figure 4, and the following observations are made: (1) the performance of COT suffers for the same reason outlined in Observation (1) for second simulated experiment. (2) The performance of COT is negatively correlated with $size(d_j)$, because as the size of data packets increase, corresponding increase in resource investment is required for encryption. (3) The performance of RNNC is substantially superior compared to COT for the same reason outlined in Observation (2) of the first simulated experiment. (4) The performance of RNNC is negatively correlated with $size(d_j)$ for the same reason outlined in Observation (2).




Figure 4: $size(d_j)$ vs AVEC

The fourth simulated experiment analyzes the performance of RNNC and COT WRT AVEC when $R(re_i)$ is varied and all other simulation parameters are kept constant. The result analysis of the fourth simulated experiment is illustrated in

Figure 5, and the following observations are made: (1) the performance of COT remains constant because $R(re_i)$ has no influence on COT. (2) RNNC substantially outperforms COT for the same reason outlined in Observation (2) of the first simulated experiment. (3) The performance of RNNC is positively correlated with $R(re_i)$, because as the number of neighbor and routing nodes $\in S$ having complete remnant energy increases, the encryption load distribution also becomes more effective due to rich resource availability in the neighbor and routing nodes of S .




Figure 5: $R(re_i)$ vs AVEC

The fifth simulated experiment analyses the performance of RNNC and COT WRT AVEC when $R(sa_i)$ is varied and all other simulation parameters are kept constant. The result analysis of the fifth simulated experiment is illustrated in Figure 6, and the following observations are made: (1) The performance of COT remains constant because $R(sa_i)$ has no influence on COT. (2) RNNC exhibits substantially performance mileage over COT for the same reason outlined in Observation (2) of the first simulated experiment. (3) The performance of RNNC is positively correlated with $R(sa_i)$, because as the number of nodes having $sa_i = 100$ increases, the encryption load distribution effectiveness increases due to rich resource availability in the neighbor and routing nodes of S .




Figure 6: $R(sa_i)$ vs AVEC

The sixth simulated experiment analyzes the performance of RNNC and COT WRT AVEC when $R(ro_i)$ is varied and all other simulation parameters are kept constant. The result analysis of the sixth simulated experiment is illustrated in Figure 7, and the following observations are made: (1) The performance of COT remains constant because $R(ro_i)$ has no influence on COT. (2) The relatively superior performance of RNNC over COT is due to the same reason outlined in Observation (2) of the first simulated experiment. (3) The performance of RNNC is positively correlated with $R(ro_i)$, because as the number of nodes having $ro_i = 100$ increases, the encryption load distribution effectiveness increases due to rich resource availability in the neighbor nodes of S .




Figure 7: $R(ro_i)$ vs AVEC

6. CONCLUSION

In this paper, an energy efficient data packet encryption scheme for WSNs denoted as RNNC was presented. The RNNC scheme distributed the data packet encryption load of the source node to its neighbor and routing nodes. The RNNC scheme was designed through randomized algorithm, and the formal performance bounds of this algorithm were outlined. The RNNC scheme was compared against the contemporary technique in simulated environment. In the outlined simulation analysis study, the performance of RNNC scheme was analyzed through multiple experiments, and the RNNC scheme outperformed the contemporary technique in-terms of energy utilization.

The main limitation of the RNNC scheme is that, it is not designed through approximation algorithm. The main drawback of randomized algorithm in designing RNNC scheme is that, only probabilistic performance bounds can be established. Hence, there can be scenarios in which, the randomized algorithm might exhibit limited performance. If approximation algorithms are utilized in designing the RNNC scheme, guaranteed performance bounds in all scenarios can be obtained.

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